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NOTES
Comparable Worth and
the Fair Pay Act of 1994
INTRODUCrION
C ongress has attempted to close the wage gap that exists between
men's and women's compensation since the passage of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
However, Congress' success in raising the level of women's pay to that
of men's has been limited.2 The statistics relating to pay inequity, even
in this "enlightened age," are astounding. Women on the average are paid
only seventy-one percent of men's wages.3 Women lose $420,000 indivi-
' Testimony on Fair Pay Act July 21, 1994: Joint Hearing of Subcomms.
ofHouse Education and Labor and Post Office and Civil Service Comms., 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), 1994 DLR 139d6, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
DLABRT File (statement of RepresentativeEleanor Holmes Norton) [hereinafter
Hearing].
2 Id. (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National Committee on Pay
Equity) ("The answer, quite simply, is that those laws do not address the deeply-
rooted historical bias in compensation systems nor the problem of occupational
segregation."); Testimony July 21. 1994: Joint Hearing on the Fair Pay Act of
1994, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst
File (opening statement of Major R. Owens, Congressman) ("[T]he gains for
female workers have been painfully slow and pitifully small.").
3 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michelle Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity). Studies show that the wage gap is even wider for
minority women: African American women earn only 64% and Hispanic women
55% of what White men earn. Testimony on Fair Pay Act July 21, 1994: Before
the Subcomm. on Select Education and Civil Rights of the House Comm. on
Education andLabor and the Subcomm. on Compensation and EmployeeBenefits
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (testimony of Robert M.
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dually over a lifetime due to pay inequity,4 and over $100 billion
collectively on an annual basis.' While statistics show that the wage gap
has decreased by ten percent since 1980, one-third to one-half of the
decrease is not attributable to a rise in women's salaries, but to a decrease
in the wages of men.'
It is in sex-segregated occupations where the disparity in wages has
the widest impact.7 "Job segregation intrinsically is connected to wage
discrimination because patriarchal influences that restrict women's choices
of jobs also depress the wages paid in those jobs."8 Women have been
historically kept in these occupations at wages well below what they are
actually worth.9 Those occupations that are lower paying are over-
whelmingly female-dominated jobs."° As more and more women are
Tobias, National President, National Treasury Employees Union) [hereinafter
Robert M. Tobias].
4 Testimony on Fair Pay Act July 21, 1994: Before the Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service and the Subcomm. on Select Education and Civil Rights of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (testimony of Gene R. Voegtlin, Legislative
Liaison, National Federation of Federal Employees) [hereinafter Gene R.
Voegtlin].
5 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity).
6 Pay Equity as a Remedy for Wage Discrimination: Success in State
Governments: Testimony Concerning the Fair Pay Act of 1994 Before House
Subcomm. on Select Education and Civil Rights, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (testimony of Heidi I. Hartmann,
Director, Women's Policy Research) [hereinafter Heidi L Hartmann]; Hearing,
supra note 1 (statement of Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton).
' Amelia K. Duroska, Comparable Work, Comparable Pay: Rethinking the
Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Washington, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 245,
246 (1986) (stating that the wage disparity is most noticeable in
occupations where 70% or more of workers are women or 90% or more of
workers are men).
8 Id. at 248.
' American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that a politically and socially male-dominated society has steeredwomen
into lower paying jobs).
10 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Judith L. Lichtman, President,
Women's Legal Defense Fund). In the federal sector, women hold two-thirds of
the lower graded jobs. Robert M Tobias, supra note 3.
1278 [VOL. 84
COMPARABLE WORTH
crowded into predominately female occupations, it only serves to
saturate the market for those occupations, and thus lowers wages even
further.1
Over half of working women and a larger percentage of men are
working in occupations dominated by their sex. 2 A study which
controlled for productivity-related characteristics, indicated that individu-
als working in an occupation that is predominantly female still earn
significantly less than those in predominantly male occupations." Many
jobs are paid less primarily because they are dominated by women.' 4
As the desegregation of occupations is not likely to occur in the near
future,15 further measures are necessary to remedy the present disparities
between men's and women's wages which are not addressed by the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII. Comparable worth legislation seems to be the only
answer.'
6
The Equal Pay Act and Title VII have been important tools in
remedying wage disparity in the United States. However, the courts are
unequipped and unwilling to venture into the comparable worth arena to
"finish[ ] the job" and close the wage gap any further. " The present
anti-discrimination laws "do not address the deeply-rooted historical bias
in compensation systems nor the problem of occupational segregation."'"
It is unlikely that the courts on their own will ever accept comparable
" Elaine Sorenson, Measuring the Pay Disparity Between TypicallyFemale
Occupations and Other Jobs: A Bivariate Selectivity Approach, 42 INDus. &
LAB. REL. Rv. 624, 625 (1989).
12 Heidi L Hartmann, supra note 6 (stating that 48% of women and 71% of
men were in same-sex dominated jobs in 1980).
"3 Sorenson, supra note 11, at 625 (approximately 15% less).
14 Robert M. Tobias, supra note 3.
15 Heidi L Hartmann, supra note 6 (stating that to desegregatejobs, 53% of
all men or women would have to switch jobs).
16 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity) ("Only by comparing the skills, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions of female and male dominated jobs, and paying equal
wages for jobs equivalent in those factors, will continued progress against wage
discrimination be made.").
17 Id. (statement of Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton); see Power v.
Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 722 (W.D. Mich. 1982) ("[M]ere claim of
unequal pay for comparable work does not state a valid claim under either Title
VII or the Equal Pay Act.").
18 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity).
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worth as a viable theory sufficient to enforce a Title VII or Equal Pay
Act claim. 19
Critics insist that not only does comparable worth not fit well into
existing analytical models used by courts to determine sexual discri-
mination, but that it also provides no standards by which the judiciary can
rule on the merits. 0 Courts assert that it is not the responsibility of the
judicial system to draw comparisons of the relative worth of different
jobs.2' In frustration with the reluctance of the courts, many comparable
worth advocates have taken their fight to the state legislatures.22 It seems
a futile effort to expect the Supreme Court ever to accept, without further
guidance from Congress, the concept of comparable worth.
To see the need for comparable worth legislation, we must first look
at where the present anti-discrimination laws fall short of the goal of
equal pay. Part I of this Note focuses on the Equal Pay Act and the
advancements and limitations this legislation has made upon wage
discrimination claims.23 Part II analyzes the scope of the comparable
worth theory under Title VII with regard to disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims.24 Finally, Part I discusses the proposed
amendments to the Equal Pay Act which would incorporate the
comparable worth theory into law and any arguments that might be
presented against and in favor of comparable worth. This Note
concludes that comparable worth is a practical method to lessen and
eventually eliminate the discriminating gap in wages between women and
men. However, the new and direct legislation proposed in the Fair Pay
19 Mack A. Player, Exorcising the Bugaboo of "Comparable Worth":
Disparate Treatment Analysis of Compensation Differences Under Title VII, 41
ALA. L. REv. 321, 322 (1990) (stating that, regardless of merit, comparable
worth is insufficient for a Title VII claim).
20 Id. at 367.
21 Susan Kelley-Claybrook,.The Comparable Worth Dilemma: Are Apples
and Oranges Ripe for Comparison?, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 227, 238-47 (1985)
(describing cases from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and the District Courts of
Michigan and Connecticut, which state that courts have been unwilling to
compare dissimilar jobs. The author also cites cases from the District Courts of
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania where the theory has received only a limited
acceptance).
22 Id. at 251. Although the author is aware of the action taken by the states
in enacting comparable worth legislation, this Note focuses on federal action.
23 See infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 46-97 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 98-155 and accompanying text.
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Act is necessary, if not vital, in order for the concept of comparable
worth to receive legal recognition in our administrative and judiciary
systems.26
I. THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
The Equal Pay Ace' was the first anti-discrimination legislation to
"[bring] with it the vision of an end to unequal pay" between the
sexes.28 The legislative history indicates that the original versions of the
Equal Pay Act, based on the policies of the National War Board during
World War II, were intended to encompass equal pay for equivalent
jobs.2 Many legislative proposals used the National War Board's policy
as a model for anti-discrimination legislation, but it was not until the
early 1960s that Congress began to get serious about the passage of an
Equal Pay Act.3" Limiting the Equal Pay Act to only prohibiting
unequal pay for equal work was an alternative proposal put before the
legislature, primarily to release the employer from the burden of making
job comparisons." Congress also ultimately rejected the comparable
worth standard in favor of the "equal pay for equal work" standard.32
26 See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
27 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Equal Pay Act reads in pertinent part:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv)
a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That
an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this
subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
28 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Judith L. Lichtman, President,
Women's Legal Defense Fund).
29 Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 724 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
3 0 Id.
3' Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d. 257, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
32 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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In adopting this standard, Congress expressly rejected comparable
worth.3 Representative Charles E. Goodell expressed Congress' intent
to narrow the scope of the Equal Pay Act:
I think it is important that we have clear legislative history at this point.
Last year when the House changed the word "comparable " to "equal"
the clear intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from
"comparable" to "equal" meaning that the jobs involved should be
virtually identical, that is, that they would be very much alike or closely
related to each other.
We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an establishment
and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the
Department say, "Well, they amount to the same thing," and evaluate
them so that they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to
apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal.34
The Equal Pay Act has only had a limited effect in remedying wage
disparities, primarily due to the strict limitations placed upon it at its
inception. The Equal Pay Act prohibits unequal pay for "substantially
equal" work.35 While not mandating that the work be identical, this
standard falls short of a comparable work standard. 6 Equal work is
determined by comparing the jobs to determine whether they both require
equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.37
These determinations are made, not based upon a job title or a description
of a particular occupation, but on "actual job performance and con-
tent."'38 Even though courts have implied that dissimilar jobs could be
" Id. Congress felt that a comparable worth standard would involve the
Court in making subjective assessments concerning the worth of dissimilar jobs.
The Court also expressed concern over the effect of this doctrine on the law of
supply and demand. Id.
" Id. at 187 (citing 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963)).
3s Thompson, 678 F.2d at 271.
36 Id. (stating that "substantially equal" falls between "exactly alike" and
"comparable").
37 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686,
697 (9th Cir.) ("A plaintiff may show that the jobs are substantially
equal, not necessarily that they are identical."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
18 Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 697 (stating that actual job performance, rather than
description is determinative); Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 592 (1lth
Cir. 1994) (stating that only the skills which are needed for the job are evaluated
under the Equal Pay Act), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S. No. 94-123).
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compared to a certain extent,39 actual decisions have strictly construed
what constitutes equal work. In EEOC v. Madison Community Unit
School District No. 12, the Seventh Circuit held that high school coaches
of male and female teams of the same sport could be considered
substantially equal, but rejected the notion that coaches of different sports
were equal under the guidelines of the Equal Pay Act despite the fact that
the duties were similar.4" The court also gave examples of other cases
where the definition of equal work was narrowly drawn.4 The result of
such decisions has been to limit severely the number of situations where
the Equal Pay Act can provide relief.
There is no doubt, due to the legislative history and the courts'
decisions, that a claim under the comparable worth doctrine is clearly and
specifically repudiated as a valid, actionable claim under the Equal Pay
Act.42 Thus, women in sex-segregated jobs who are being paid unequal
wages have no available remedy under the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay
Act does not prohibit an employer from discriminating against women by
paying them lower wages when they are performing jobs of equal or
greater skill than their male counterparts.43 The Equal Pay Act does not
'9 EEOC v. Madison Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 580
(7th Cir. 1987) (implying that some comparisons of different jobs are
possible).
40 Id. at 583-84. The court, however, compared its decision to that in Brock
v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026 (1lth Cir. 1985), which held
that "teaching different subjects, and teaching physical education but with
different coaching duties - intramural athletics program versus intercollegiate
basketball team - [are] equal within meaning of Act" and Thompson v. Sawyer,
678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which held that jobs in the same bindery were
substantially equal even though performed on different machines. Madison, 818
F.2d at 582-83. Clearly the decision in Madison cannot be reconciled with the
rulings in Brock and Thompson.
4, Madison, 818 F.2d at 582.
42 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 186 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see Madison, 818 F.2d at 580 (stating that the Equal Pay Act is "not
a general mandate of sex neutral compensation"); Power v. Barry County, 539
F. Supp. 721, 725 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (stating that the Equal Pay Act addressed
the issue of equal pay for equal work and was not "to be invoked to mandate
equality of pay for jobs of different content").
43 Madison, 818 F.2d at 580 ("The working conditions of a janitor are
different from those of a secretary, and so are the skills and responsibilities of
the two jobs. The [Equal Pay] Act does not prohibit paying different wages even
if the result is to pay a woman less than a man and by doing so 'underpay' her
1995-96] 1283
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even extend to job duties which are unequal due to gender motivation.'
Therefore, if an employer's reason for giving different duties to male and
female employees is based upon sex, then a woman has no claim under
the Equal Pay Act because the jobs performed are not substantially
equal. 4' All of these distinctions serve to make the Equal Pay Act
useless as a tool for asserting a comparable worth theory of relief.
II. TTLE VII OF THE CIVm RIGHTS Act OF 1964
In terms of sex discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
46
gives a broader basis under which claimants can obtain relief, and, as a
result, plaintiffs have tried to have the comparable worth theory judicially
accepted under this legislation. Originally, Title VII was not meant to
address sex discrimination at all.47 The provisions relating to sex
discrimination were added to the bill just two days before the final vote
on Title VII took place.48 As a result, there is no explicit discussion as
to whether the boundaries of compensation are limited to equal work or
whether it encompasses comparable worth as well.49 It is a theory of
some legislative scholars that the inclusion of sex discrimination within
the provisions of Title VII was an attempt by the proposing Congressman
to defeat the bill. However, the strategy failed and the bill was adopted
into law. °
"Player, supra note 19, at 329.
45 Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Title VII reads in pertinent part: "(a)
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ......
41 Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 725 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(stating that sex discrimination did not play an important role in hearings
concerning Title VII).
48 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 172 (1981).
49 American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafterAFSCME v. Washington] ("The
legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is notable
primarily for its brevity." (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
143 (1976))); accord Power, 539 F. Supp. at 725.
50 Power, 539 F. Supp. at 725.
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It was under the prohibitions of Title VII that its advocates hoped the
courts would recognize comparable worth as a legal theory, specifically
in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in County of
Washington v. Gunther."l In Gunther, the female guards at the women's
section of the county jail brought suit against the county of Washington,
Oregon, under Title VII, asserting that they were paid unequal wages for
work equivalent to that performed by their male counterparts in the men's
section of the facility. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the differen-
tial was caused by intentional sex discrimination.52 The female guards
put forth a survey conducted by the county of outside markets and the
relative worth of each job as proof of intentional discrimination.53 The
plaintiffs showed that even though the survey indicated that the duties of
the female guards were considered to be equivalent to ninety-five percent
of the duties performed by the male guards, the plaintiffs were only paid
seventy percent of the wages of their male counterparts. 4 While
emphasizing that its decision was not based on comparable worth,55 the
Court nevertheless held that the female guards' claims were not barred
simply because they performed work which was not equal to that of the
male guards.56
The Supreme Court based its decision upon a reinterpretation of the
Bennett Amendment, 57 which was added to Title VII to clarify the
relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, which was passed
a year earlier.58 Prior to the Court's decision in Gunther, the Bennett
Amendment had been interpreted to incorporate not only the four
affirmative defenses - seniority, merit, productivity, and any factor other
than sex - mandated by the Equal Pay Act, but also the equal work
standard.59 After reviewing the legislative history, the Court determined
51 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
52Id. at 164.
51 Id. at 165.
54 Id. at 180.
55Id. at 166.
56 Id. at 181.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). The Bennett Amendment states in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this
subehapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of [§] 206(d) of Title 29 [The Equal Pay Act].
58 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 173 (1981).
59 E.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th
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in Gunther that the Bennett Amendment only incorporated the defenses
and not the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act.
60
Although the Court expressly rejected the comparable worth argument
and emphasized the narrowness of the question involved at the outset,
advocates felt that the decision in Gunther would open the doors to
judicial acceptance of comparable worth.61 It was the enactment of Title
VII which led to the theory of comparable worth because it allowed a
broader statutory scheme for women to recover for wage discrimina-
tion.62 However, courts have consistently refused to acknowledge the
doctrine of comparable worth as a viable legal theory under both
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.63 While disparate
treatment cases require direct or circumstantial proof of discriminatory
motives, the disparate impact theory only requires that the practice have
a detrimental effect on a group in the workforce.' Neither has been
ultimately successful in gaining judicial acceptance of the comparable
worth theory.
A. Disparate Treatment
The plaintiffs in Gunther pursued their claim under the disparate
treatment theory.65 It is only through the disparate treatment theory that
any plaintiff has been able to prevail using evidence of a comparable
worth study as a basis for their claim.66 Even here, the decision in
Gunther has served to limit severely a plaintiff's chances for relief under
Cir.) (stating that the Bennett Amendment applies the equal work concept to
Title VII as it applies to the Equal Pay Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring)
(stating that an equal work showing was required under Title VII).
60 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
61 Robert L. Bragg, Comparable Worth and Title VII: The Case Against
Disparate Impact Analysis, 16 PAC. L.J. 833, 839 ("The Gunther holding thus
authorizes suits comparingjobs to be brought under Title VII. This result is most
advantageous to a comparable worth plaintiff, since the jobs being compared
need not be substantially similar as required by the Equal Pay Act.").
62 Duroska, supra note 7, at 258-59 (stating that the use of Title VII in this
context is important due to the limitations imposed by the Equal Pay Act).
63 Robert M. Tobias, supra note 3.
6 Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
61 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981).
66 Bragg, supra note 61, at 833-34, 848-50 (stating that the only permissible
theory under Title VII is discriminatory intent).
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a theory of comparable worth. Courts have consistently ruled that a
comparable worth study, by itself, is not sufficient evidence to provide
a basis for a Title VII claim.67 The courts only allow the comparable
worth theory to be relevant in a Title VII claim when it can be used to
"infer a discriminatory animus"6 from circumstantial evidence.69 It is
still the plaintiff's burden to prove discriminatory intent to make out a
case under disparate treatment; evidence of comparable worth can be used
towards proving such intent.7"
The courts, however, have not been very amenable to such evidence
in rendering their decisions on this type of claim. The failure to
implement a comparable worth study once it has been commissioned is
not sufficient to establish a violation under Title VII.7 The courts
reason that to do so would only serve to deter employers from
commissioning such studies, therefore penalizing them for their efforts
rather than commending them.72 It would also deter those states who
have yet to commission such a study from doing so." Comparable
worth is relevant only when the employer is "forced to declare his
intention[ ]" to purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex.74 The
67 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 341 (7th Cir. 1988)
(stating that job evaluation studies alone are insufficient to prove discriminatory
intent); accord Manuel v. WSBT, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 654, 659 (N.D. Ind. 1988)
(stating that an employer's failure to implement a comparable worth study did
not support a finding of discriminatory intent).
68 Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 701.
69 AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
necessarydiscriminatory animus maybe inferred from circumstantial evidence.").
70 Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 704 ("The validity or usefulness of such compara-
tive statistics therefore rests directly on their capacity to single out the factors
that convert merely different treatment into unjustified discriminatory
treatment.").
71 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1408 ("Given the scope of the alleged intentional
act, and given the attempt to show the core principle of the State's market-based
compensation system was adopted or maintained with a discriminatory purpose,
more is required to support the finding of liability than these isolated acts, which
had only an indirect relation to the compensation principle itself.").
72 Id.
71 Id. (citingAmericanNurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp 1313, 1317-18
(N.D. Ill 1985), rev'don other grounds, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986)).
74 American Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 721 (stating that the only relevance
of a comparable worth study is to prove purposeful sexual discrimination);
accord EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 342 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he key distinction is whether the implementation of the compensation
1995-96] 1287
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problem in Gunther was the fact that the State had only implemented its
comparable worth study in male job categories while failing to enact it
in female job categories.75
B. Disparate Impact
While plaintiffs have achieved limited success under the disparate
treatment theory, they have had no success under the disparate impact
theory. While making a case under disparate impact is possible using the
comparable worth theory,76 the fit is not close enough for courts to
recognize it as a legitimate claim under Title VII." Disparate impact
theory has been "confined to cases that challenge a specific, clearly
delineated employment practice applied at a single point in the job
selection process." '78 A good example would be where a female plaintiff
would claim that a specific requirement, although gender-neutral on its
face, served to eliminate women from being able to comply and
effectively precluded them from certain jobs (i.e., a height and/or weight
requirement).79 Thus far, the courts have been unable to make the
analogy under comparable worth.80 The courts further assert that to
extend Title VII to comparable worth claims under disparate impact
would "plunge [them] into uncharted and treacherous areas.'8"
The most severe and deadliest blow to the comparable worth theory
is the Ninth Circuit's decision in American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees v. Washington ("AFSCME"). 2 The district
program in response to a comparable worth study reflects discriminatory
intent.").
75 American Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 721.
76 Duroska, supra note 7, at 269.
77 Player, supra note 19, at 368 (stating that without some additions or
amendments, comparable worth does not fit well into existing analytical models
because "similar situation/dissimilar treatment is the direct application of one
well-established model of inferring motivation from circumstantial evidence").
78 AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
71 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
80 American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that it is not apparent what the analogy of comparable worth would be
to an exclusionary job qualification and furthermore that an interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment of Title VII would limit its scope to those claims involving
disparate treatment).
81 Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
82 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir 1985).
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court found that the plaintiffs had successfully proven their comparable
worth claim under the disparate impact analysis.83 Thus, the advocates
of comparable worth gained new hope in their quest for equal pay, as this
was the first case to acknowledge the use of a comparable worth analysis
under Title VII?' However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that
the precedents did not support the conclusion that the disparate impact
analysis could be employed in this case." The court specified that
disparate impact analysis should be confined to those situations in which
it had been previously employed.86 In rejecting the use of disparate
impact analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated:
The instant case does not involve an employment practice that yields to
disparate impact analysis. As we noted in an earlier case, the decision
to base compensation on the competitive market, rather than on a theory
of comparable worth, involves the assessment of a number of complex
factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be
appropriate for disparate impact analysis.87
It was the State of Washington's reliance on the market system in
determining wages that was a primary factor in the court's decision
against the plaintiff's disparate impact claim.8 The market based system
of wages has been a factor that the courts have relied on heavily in their
refusal to proceed with the comparable worth theory under Title V1. 89
3 Id. at 1403.
84 Joseph P. Loudon & Timothy D. Loudon, Applying Disparate Impact to
Title VII Comparable Worth Claims: An Incomparable Task, 61 IND. L.J. 165,
174 (1985-86) ("Prior to its reversal, AFSCME represented the only successful
attempt by a plaintiff to apply disparate impact analysis to a sex-based
comparable worth claim.").
85 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405; accord Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 706 ("[T]he
law does not go so far as to allow a prima facie case to be constructed by
showing disparate impact.").
16 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406.
87 Id. (citing Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708) (stating that the disparate impact
model cannot be usefully transferred to the theory of comparable worth).
88 Id. (stating that the plaintiff's attemptto infer discriminatorymotive from
Washington's participation in the market system failed).
89 See, e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th
Cir.) ("'We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the
market in setting wage rate for genuinely different work classifications."'
(quoting Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977))), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
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Courts have stated that even if the employer knows of the wage disparity,
they do not violate Title VII by paying male and female occupations at
their market rates.9" "Neither law nor logic deems the free market
system a suspect enterprise."9 The court reasoned that since the State
of Washington "did not create the market disparity," there is insufficient
proof to show that they were discriminatorily motivated in their use of
market wages to set salary.92 Although it is within Washington's power
to enact a comparable worth plan, "Title VII does not obligate" them to
do so." The court in AFSCME also noted that value was only one
aspect influencing the wage rate, and other considerations such as, "the
availability of workers" and "the effectiveness of collective bargaining,"
might also influence salary.94 With its finding that the laws of supply
and demand in the free market system effectively rebut Title VII, the
courts provided employers with a solid defense against comparable worth
claims under Title VII which would be nearly impossible to overcome.
After twelve years of decisions refuting the comparable worth theory
under Title VII, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will now embrace
the concept.9" Courts are adamant in refusing to acknowledge
comparable worth, and it will take nothing less than new legislation to
incorporate comparable worth into an actionable claim and thereby afford
relief to those being underpaid in sex-segregated jobs.97
90 American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that knowledge of a disparity is not the same as causing or maintaining
it).
91 AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
92 Id. at 1406.
93 Id. at 1407.
94 Id.
9' Id. ("We find nothing in the language of Title VII or its legislative history
to indicate Congress intended to abrogate fundamental economic principles such
as the laws of supply and demand or to prevent employers from competing in the
labor market.").
96 Testimony on Fair Pay Act July 21, 1994: Statement by American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO Before the Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service Comm. and the Subcomm. on Select Education and Civil Rights of
the House Education and Labor Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of John Sturdivant, National
President, American Federation of Government Employees).
"7 Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.)
("Plaintiffs are not seeking equality of opportunity in their skills as contemplated
by Title VII, . . . but instead would cross job description lines into areas of
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III. THE FAIR PAY Acr OF 1994
On July 21, 1994, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.)
introduced the Fair Pay Act of 199491 as an amendment to the Equal
Pay Act.99 In its findings in support of the proposed amendment,
Congress found that wage differentials exist in sex-segregated jobs and
commercial industries and that the existence of such differentials:
(A) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary
for their health and efficiency;
(B) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor
resources;
(C) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting, and
obstructing commerce;
(D) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
and
(E) constitutes an unfair method of competition.
100
To remedy such wage differentials, the Fair Pay Act seeks to prohibit any
employer from discriminating against employees of the opposite sex by
paying lower wages to one group of employees than it pays to a group
of the opposite sex for equivalent jobs.'' The Fair Pay Act defines the
term "equivalent jobs" to mean "jobs that may be dissimilar, but whose
entirely different skills. This would be a whole new world for the courts, and
until some better signal from Congress is received we cannot venture into it."),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); cf. Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721,
726 (W.D. Mich. 1982) ("Nor is there convincing evidence that Congress
intended to make such a theory available to those seeking redress for real and
imaginary wage inequalities.").
98 H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The Fair Pay Act amends 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1988) by adding the following:
(g)(1)(A) No employer having employees subject to any provisions
of this section shall discriminate between its employees on the basis of
sex, race, or national origin by paying wages to employees or groups of
employees at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages
to employees or groups of employees of the opposite sex or different
race or national origin for work in equivalent jobs, except where such
payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.
9' 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
'0o H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
'0' Id. Although the Fair Pay Act of 1994 also encompasses discrimination
based upon race, the author intends to focus solely upon the gender issue.
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requirements are equivalent, when viewed as a composite of skills, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions.' ' 2 In contrast to the Equal Pay
Act, the Fair Pay Act allows a comparison between dissimilar jobs which
have been evaluated as being of equal worth." 3
The Fair Pay Act also provides important protections to those
employees who may choose to bring a claim against an employer under
the Fair Pay Act. The Fair Pay Act mandates that an employer may not
lower the wages of another employee to comply with its provisions."4
This not only protects the claimant, but also those employees in the
comparative job category, from unscrupulous wage practices by an
employer.
The Fair Pay Act also prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any employee who brings a claim or participates in any manner
in a proceeding brought under the Act.0 5 These prohibitions extend not
only to the discharge of employment, but also to any form of harassment,
including threats, coercion, or intimidation experienced by an employee
in pursuing their own claim or in assisting and encouraging another
employee's claim. 6 Passage of the Fair Pay Act would greatly increase
the remedies available to women to combat wage disparity while at the
same time providing sufficient protection against retaliation for pursuing
these claims.
A. Criticism and Support for Comparable Worth
It is obvious from the courts' reluctance to recognize comparable
worth that the passage of the Fair Pay Act is necessary. However, it will
102 Id.
103 Id.
0 4 Id.
105 Id. Congress proposed to amend 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1988) by malking it a
violation:
(6) to discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by section 6(g) or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under section 6(g); or
(7) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against, coerce,
intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any employee or any other person
because the employee inquired about, disclosed, compared, or otherwise
discussed the employee's wages or the wages of any other employee, or
because the employee exercised, enjoyed, aided, or encouraged any other
person to exercise or enjoy any right granted or protected by section 6(g).
106 H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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not be easy to overcome the opposition, who consider the concept
nonviable in a legal setting. Job evaluation studies which are conducted
by researchers to determine the comparable worth of dissimilar jobs are
usually based upon a point system.' °7 Factors are weighted based on the
following: "1) knowledge; 2) mental and physical demands; and 3)
responsibility."' ' Some studies also add working conditions in their
analysis.
10 9
An example of such a system is the Willis Study. This study was
used by the State of Washington and was described by the court in
AFSCME v. Washington:"
Comparable worth was calculatedby evaluatingjobs under four criteria:
knowledge and skills, mental demand, accountability, and working
conditions. A maximum number of points was allotted to each category:
280 for knowledge and skills, 140 for physical demands, 160 for
accountability, and 20 for working conditions. Every job was assigned
a numerical value under each of the four criteria.'
The weighted factors are combined to arrive at a total score to determine
job worth.1
2
The Willis Study is not the only method for evaluating dissimilarjobs
in an establishment; on the contrary, employers have a selection from
which to choose. Another example is the Hay Guide Chart-Profile
Method utilized by Sears and described in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, &
Co.I" The methods are similar to those used in the Willis Study in that
107 Bragg, supra note 61, at 844.
108 Id.
o Heidi . Hartmann, supra note 6.
11o 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
I I Id. at 1403.
..2 Heidi L Hartmann, supra note 6. One of Hartmann's examples of such
a comparison is between a delivery truck driver and a clerk typist.
SUBSTANTIVE MOTOR PHYSICAL WORKING
COMPLEXITY SKILLS DEMANDS CONDITIONS TOTAL
Delivery
Truck Driver: 50 30 30 20 130
Clerk Typist: 95 20 10 5 130
"3 839 F.2d 302, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1988).
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the Hay method assigns evaluation points for "know-how, problem
solving, and accountability" required in the average duties for each
position.'
14
1. Cost Effectiveness
Opponents of comparable worth present many arguments against the
use of these job evaluation studies. Some opponents of the comparable
worth theory predict that utilization of the theory will cause a substantial
decline in employment due to employers having to pay higher wages to
correct inequity."' Critics suggest that higher wages will cause
employers to hire fewer people and will therefore shrink the job market
for both men and women.1 6 These same arguments, however, were
presented in opposition of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.17 They were as
unfounded then as they are now.
Supporters insist that there is a way to implement the program in a
cost-effective way. At present, twenty-four states have undertaken
comparable worth studies and twenty states have taken the further step of
adjusting upward the wages of workers in the lower paying female
jobs.1 Most states have been able to do this by expending a minimal
percentage of their payroll budget and have closed their wage gap by a
significant percentage." 9 "In many of these cases, minimal costs have
resulted in significant gains towards the eradication of wage discrimina-
tion." ' Studies have also shown that there has been no significant
effect on employment growth in those states which have implemented
comparable worth.' It is unrealistic to assume that the implementation
114 Id. at 344.
115 Heidi . Hartmann, supra note 6.
16 AmericanNurses' Ass'nv. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7thCir. 1986).
"17 Heidi I. Hartmann, supra note 6 ("This argument was heard during the
debates about the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ... but statistical analyses have not
found any disemployment effects of these earlier laws.").
118 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity).
19 Id. (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National Committee on Pay
Equity).
12 Id. (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National Committee on Pay
Equity).
12 Heidi L Hartmann, supra note 6 (stating that most of the states that have
implemented pay equity show virtually no effect on employment growth; those
states that have shown a negative impact implemented fewer controls to
counteract other changes that might have been occurring).
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of such a program can be realized without the expenditure of some
money. However, it is equally unrealistic to deny such expenditures if
they can effectively eradicate wage discrimination in the United States.
To begrudge women the pay they are entitled to simply because of the
extra cost is to base our entire system of wages upon sex discrimina-
tion.
122
Comparable worth is not as radical a concept as the United States
courts judge it to be; other countries have already enacted legislation to
encompass comparable worth claims.' Interestingly, the United States
lags far behind the other countries of the world in its wage disparities
between men and women.'24 The example of a comparable worth
system that is closest to home and involves perhaps the most
comprehensive legislation is the Pay Equity Act of Canada. 2 The
purpose of the Pay Equity Act is to overcome discrimination based on the
gender of employees in "female job classes," and, therefore, has
"confined its attention to that part of the wage gap produced by the
underevaluation of women's work.'
2 6
The Pay Equity Act mandates that all employers with 100 or more
employees conduct a job evaluation study to determine whether wage
disparity exists within their establishment between male and female
dominated jobs of equal value,'27 and to post a pay equity plan
describing the adjustments to be made and a timetable for correcting these
" AccordAileenMcColganLegislatingEqualPay?LessonsFrom Canada,
22 INDus. L.J. 269, 283 (1993) ("'If one were to honestly believe economists
and employers who cry out that equal value will be disastrous for the economy,
causing inflation and wide-spreadunemployment, then it appears that the ongoing
health of the Canadian economy depends mainly on the exploitation of working
women .... I cannot think of any other area of human rights legislation where
it is a legitimate point of discussion to debate whether society can afford the
costs of eliminating discrimination."' (quoting Mary Cornish, Equal Pay for
Work of Equal Value Conference (Mar. 18-19, 1986))).
• " See id. (discussing relevant legislation in the United Kingdom and
Canada).
124 Heidi L Hartmann, supra note 6. In countries like Australia, Denmark,
France, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, women are paid 80% to 90% of
what their male counterparts receive. In the United States women receive 70%
of what men are paid. Id.
125 Pay Equity Act, R.S.O., ch. 34 (1988) (Can.).
126 McColgan, supra note 122, at 272-73.
127 Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Comparable Worth in Ontario: Lessons the
United States Can Learn, 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 110 (1994).
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wage disparities.' Smaller companies with less than a hundred
employees are still required to correct wage discrepancies, however, the
posting of a pay equity plan is optional. 29 The pay equity plans are
posted so that all employees are able to review them.13 The selection
of an evaluation system is entirely within the discretion of the employer
as long as it is gender neutral and evaluates the work performed on the
basis of four criteria - skill, effort, responsibility, and work
conditions.3 3 A 'minimum of one percent of the[ ] payroll" must be
spent each year to correct the wage disparities found by the job
evaluation studies.
3 1
The proposed Fair Pay Act is similar to the legislation in Canada, but
its requirements are not as stringent nor as detailed, leaving that aspect
of its effectiveness to an administrative agency. While the Fair Pay Act
and the Pay Equity Act both mandate the same criteria be used in
evaluating the relative worth of dissimilar jobs, 3 3 the Fair Pay Act
contains no specific guidelines on which employers would be required to
file evaluation studies. The power to regulate the reporting and filing of
evaluation reports is left in the hands of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC").134 "The [EEOC] shall issue rules and
regulations prescribing the form and content of reports required to be
filed.., and such other reasonable rles and regulations as it may find
necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion of such reporting
requirements.' ' 35 The EEOC also has the power to allow a smaller
employer to file a simplified report instead of a full evaluation. 36 As
in Canada, the reports filed by an employer with the EEOC would be
available to employees and the public.
37
The Pay Equity Act is not without its shortcomings, and scholars
have cited "gaps in its coverage."'38 However, Canada remains commit-
.28 McColgan, supra note 122, at 275.
129 Kubasek et al., supra note 127, at 111.
130 Id. at 112.
131 McColgan, supra note 122, at 274 (stating that the "choice of job
comparison system [sic] is a matter of managerial prerogative subject only to the
Act's requirement[s]").
132 Kubasek et al., supra note 127, at 111.
133 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
134 H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 McColgan, supra note 122, at 281 (citing the lack of a "definition of pay
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ted to the legislation and has amended its Act in an effort to strengthen
the statute's ability to remedy wage disparity.' Several lessons can be
learned from Canada's legislation and experience in their quest to provide
relief to those in sex-segregated occupations. "One of the fundamental
lessons from the Ontario experience is that a pay equity system can be
imposed without major disruption if considerable foresight is
applied."'40 Placing the specifics of the evaluations into the hands of
the EEOC should render the Fair Pay Act more effective to manage and
should make it easier to close whatever loopholes employers may
discover in attempts to get around the Act's mandate.
Also of importance is the fact that the implementation of comparable
worth theory in Canada has not caused any major problems in the
Canadian economic system and has proven to be compatible with the
market system already in place.' The success Canada has had in
effectively and smoothly implementing such legislation should provide
ample evidence and encouragement that it is possible to duplicate such
legislation in the United States with minimal or no upset to the economic
and market systems already used in the workplace.
2. Standard of Evaluation
Other critics assert that the standard is "so subjective, so divorced
from objective norms, that the concept provides no justiciable standard
by which liability can be articulated." '142 The courts have upheld this
assertion. 4 3 Even the Supreme Court in County of Washington v.
Gunther described comparable worth as a comparison of intrinsic
worth." Such a disparity will be evidenced by disagreements among
experts concerning the relative value of the same factors.' The results
equity" and "the failure to provide any systematic supervision of employers").
' Kubasek et al., supra note 127, at 123.
140 Id. at 130.
14' Id. at 131 ("For all its shortcomings, implementation of comparableworth
in Ontario has not caused any major disruptions in the nation's economy.").
142 Player, supra note 19, at 366 n.170.
14' E.g., Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983)
("Plemer asks too much. She would have the courts make an essentially
subjective assessment of the value of the differing duties and responsibilities of
the positions... and then determine whether Plemer was paid less than the value
of her position because she was female.").
144452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981).
14' Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 21, at 234 (citing Lemons v. City and
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of the studies would be affected by the objectives of the evaluators.
Sexism may cause such factors as "physical demands and working
conditions" most commonly associated with male dominated professions
to be assigned a greater weight than the "skill and responsibility" which
are commonly predominant in female dominated occupations.
146
However, a study conducted to look for sexual discrimination might tend
to overemphasize these factors. 47 Critics have emphasized the need to
"protect" employers from unfair judgments against their compensation
practices: "Ultimately, the fate of an employer still rests on the results of
a job evaluation study. The employer can only hope that the results are
not too badly skewed by subjective input."'
148
Regardless of the fact that some disparities can be shown with
different types of comparable worth studies, they all indicate the same
thing: Individuals working in occupations that are traditionally female are
earning significantly less than individuals working in traditionally male
occupations. 149 Many opponents of comparable worth theory believe
that employers should be able to continue to rely on market factors in
determining the amount of salary which should be paid. However, a wage
system based upon demand in the market is just as subjectively based as
comparable worth. Because of the pervasive discrimination in the market,
it cannot accurately reflect the relative value of traditionally female
occupations.' By allowing employers to rely on the market to base
wages is, in effect, to perpetuate the long history of discrimination which
created the market in the first place.'
County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 906, 907 (D. Colo. 1978),
afid, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980)) (stating that
one "could never find any two experts who would be in complete agreement"
about the value of the jobs in the United States).
'46 Bragg, supra note 61, at 845.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 851.
"49 Sorenson, supra note 11, at 625.
0 Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 705 n.10 (9th Cir.)
("Comparable worth theorists have also attempted to argue that discriminatory
practices in the labor market are ultimately inefficient because [they are] not job
related. This, of course, can be said only based on the belief that the market is
defective."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
'' See AmericanNurses'Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that advocates of comparable worth urge "that collective bargaining,
public regulation of wages and hours, and the lack of information and mobility
of some workers make the market model an inaccurate description of how
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3. Effect on Job Desegregation
Other critics have rejected comparable worth as being detrimental to
the equality of women in the workplace. It is argued that enacting
comparable pay for comparable work would serve to enforce the
segregation by sex which currently exists in the workforce by eliminating
the incentive for women to leave female dominated occupations and
integrate into those traditionally held by men.'52 Phyllis Schafly, an
attorney and staunch opponent of comparable worth, avers that such a
policy would be detrimental to the equalization of women in the
workforce:
After all, why would a woman want to be a telephone pole repair
person, a highway ditch digger or a prison guard if she could get the
same pay working in a carpeted climate controlled office?... Now I
ask you: if you were a female secretary, would you switch to a job as
relative wages are determined and how they influence the choice of jobs.").
152 Phyllis Schafly, The Comparable Worth Debacle: Attempt to EndAlleged
Wage Disparities Creates More Problems Than It Solves, L.A. DAILY J., June
29, 1990, at 6; accord American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 719-20. It is
interesting that while the court in American Nurses'Ass'n considers comparable
worth to be a detriment to the desegregation of the workforce, the court
continues its analysis by determining that desegregation will cause a decline in
the available number of jobs in the workforce. The court states:
If the movement should cause wages in traditionally men's jobs to be
depressed below their market level and wages in traditionally women's
jobs to be jacked above their market level, women will have less
incentive to enter traditionally men's fields and more to enter
traditionally women's fields. Analysis cannot stop there, because the
change in relative wages will send men in the same direction: fewer
men will enter the traditionally men's jobs, more the traditionally
women's jobs. As a result there will be more room for women in
traditionally men's jobs and at the same time fewer opportunities for
women in traditionally women's jobs - especially since the number of
those jobs will shrink as employers are induced by the higher wage to
substitute capital for labor inputs (e.g., more word processors, fewer
secretaries). Labor will be allocated less efficiently; men and women
alike may be worse off.
American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 719-20. The court seems to view the
implementation of the comparable worth theory as a no-win situation for both
women and men.
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prison guard at the same or slightly less pay just for the satisfaction of
... moving women into "nontraditional" jobs?
53
Arguments such as these do not address the realities of the American
workplace. First, not every woman wants to work in a traditionally male-
dominated job as Ms. Schafly suggests. Instead, some women prefer to
remain in their present occupation, female-dominated though it may
be.' To follow Schafly's rationale would be to punish those women
who desire to remain in their present female-dominated occupations by
not affording them a way to ensure fair pay for the worth of their jobs.
Second, the desegregation of the workforce is not an easy task to
accomplish. To fully desegregate the workforce, fifty-three percent of all
men or all women would have to switch occupations to those that are
predominantly held by the opposite sex. 5 As this is unlikely to occur
within the next few years, if at all, the proposed legislation of the Fair
Pay Act is the only viable solution available to provide this class of
workers in female-dominated jobs with the necessary outlet to assert their
right to equal pay for equivalent jobs.
CONCLUSION
The benefits of the Fair Pay Act, if enacted by Congress, are many.
In this modem age where women are frequently the sole support for their
families, the need for pay equity is great. Women deserve to be paid
equal wages for work of equal value to the employer. Discriminating
against women serves only to deprive them of the needed income
necessary to support their families."
6
Pay equity can only serve further to boost productivity ratings for
employers by raising the level of morale in the workplace. 7 If workers
... Schafly, supra note 152, at 6.
' Zona Spaetch, a plaintiffin the lawsuit, AFSCME v. Washington, testified
before Capitol Hill concerning her involvement in the case, stating: "I have never
desired to work in the fields which are dominated predominantly by men. I have
only wanted fair pay for the job I have." Testimony on Fair Pay Act July 21,
1994: Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the
House Comm. on Post Office Civil Service and the Subcomm. on Select
Education and Civil Rights of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File
(testimony of Zona Spaetch, Spokane, Washington) [hereinafter Zona Spaetch].
's' Heidi . Hartmann, supra note 6.
I56 Id.
' Gene R. Voegtlin, supra note 4 ("High worker morale hinges on whether
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believe they are being treated and compensated fairly for the work they
perform, it can only serve to encourage pride in their occupations and a
desire to perform such jobs to the best of their abilities. To eradicate
wage discrimination will give those workers the dignity of being paid
what they are worth. ' As Zona Spaetch, a plaintiff in AFSCME, so
succinctly stated:
Are the people who care for your children, nurse your father and
mother, and teach in our public schools as valuable as the people who
fix your plumbing and excavatethe ground for buildings? Is the surgical
nurse as valuable as the hospital administrator? Are the skills to operate
the advanced technology in office equipment as critical as those needed
to repair an electrical circuit? These are important questions which no
doubt you will have to debate as you consider the Fair Pay Act.
The feminization of poverty is more than a concept, it is something
which is very real to me. My mother, grandmother, and great
grandmother, fought very hard to provide for families and maintain their
pride and dignity, often at the expense of their own health. And now,
my daughters continue to fight very hard to do the same in a very un-
equal workplace." 9
The Fair Pay Act will provide the nation with a clear set of remedies
to address the realities of pay inequity in America today. 60 This
legislation will pick up where the Equal Pay Act and Title VII have left
off in the ongoing fight against sex discrimination in compensation.
Congress and the courts have gone too far in their attempts to-balance the
inequities between the sexes to stop with the present legislation which,
although instrumental in remedying the most overt forms of discrimina-
tion, falls substantially short of addressing the subtler forms of discrimi-
nation which pervade our society.
To believe the opponents of comparable worth is to believe that we
live in a perfect society where women and men are evaluated on the basis
of their skills alone and that both sexes have the same opportunities in
employment and compensation. The reality is somewhat less than perfect.
the employees believe they are being treated fairly and consistently with
management.").
158 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, National
Committee on Pay Equity).
'59 Zona Spaetch, supra note 154.
160 Gene R. Voegtlin, supra note 4 (summarizing the provisions of the Fair
Pay Act).
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Thus, the passage of the Fair Pay Act is a necessary and vital next step
on the path to equality in this country.
Rhonda Jennings Blackburn
